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1. AIR DEFENCE 
With man's mastery over the third dimension - the near atmosphere and space 
- it has become increasingly necessary to protect oneself not merely from attacks from 
land and the sea but, more importantly, from attacks from the air. This was recognised 
< 
even during the World War I1 and apdimentary air defence capability was sought 
to be established; by the RIMJ swwdiance and the anti-aircraft guns. The 
advent of radar signified a major e in air defence technology and techniques. 
Rather than depend on visual observation and the hazards and limitations thereof, it 
became possible with radar to detect the presence of flying objects at much great 
distances. The PPI display of a conventional air-surveillance radar permits an operator 
to scan the sky for several hundreds of kiometers all around. Early radar-based air 
defence systems were dependent on human observation and decision making for 
detecting targets, identifying them, deciding on interception strategy and for recovering 
*- the interceptor after completion of his mission. This was feasible because, with a radar 
of between 200 to 400 kilometers and aircraft speeds in the range of 500 
kilometers per hour, upto 30 minutes warning was available before the target was 
overhead. 
2. COMPUTERISATION 
In the. pre-computer days, identification of friend or foe was done taking into 
account available flight plans. IFF codes and other diverse information was used to 
the extent possible. Assessment of threat, likewise, had to be qualitative and semi 
intuitive rather than systematic and quantitative. Even tracking a single aircraft among 
a diversity of targets required a good deal of skill. Weapon allocation to neutralise 
the threat had to be done on the basis of simple thumb rules rather than systematically, 
quantitatively and logically. How well an interceptor could be guided and controlled 
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in response to evasive and or misleading maneouvres by the target, depended entirely 
o n  the skill and experience of the controller. Recovery of the interceptor has again 
to be managed using adhoc, and subjective methods. Therefore, 
consistently good quality response could not be assured. While expert controllers 
could be depended upon to operate with maximum effectiveness and efficiency under 
nearly all circumstances, it was extremely difficult to improve the performance of the 
mediocre. The crucial question was: 'could one somehow achieve performance 
approaching that of an expert controller even from a controller with average or below 
average skills?' 
The important contribution of computerisation in air defence was the facility that 
it provided of: 
(a) enunciating air defence procedures 
unambiguous terms, 
(b) assessing their validity and merit both in the abstract as well as in specific 
(hypothetic or even in real life) situations and, finally, 
(c) incorporating them into software which, subsequently, would behave with the 
utmost reproducability, consistency, reliability and efficiency. 
Consider for instance the strategy to be adopted for intercepting an aircraft in 
the sky. The computer visualised the profile to be followed by the interceptor as 
consisting of a fixed (say upto 16) number of segments. Depending on the situation 
in each case the detedirnes the parameters defining each of these segments 
on the basis of various criteria: minimum time, minimum fuel or any other relevant 
consideration. The machine then makes several (say upto three) alternatives available 
to the controller leaving the final choice to him. During interception, it would not 
flood him with details and instructions ahead of time. It would give these in steps, 
each a few seconds before it is actually required to be communicated to the pilot. It 
keeps continuously reassessing the situation and recomputes the profile whenever the 
target behaviour changes significantly. This would be accomplished by suitably 
modifying the still unexecuted segments of the profile. The controller would not even 
be aware that such a recomputation has taken place, because he was not informed 
about these segments ahead of time. A much more significant advantage is also 
obvious: the quality of profile computation is now assured, irrespective of the persona1 
experience, intelligence and competence of the controller. The below average 
controller can therefore be helped to respond as well as an expert would. The oniy 
assumption is that the strategy incorporated into the profile generation software is as 
good as that adopted by an expert controller. 
This advantage alone is adequate justification for the induction of computers into 
air defence. Quite apart from this, recent developments in aircraft technology have 
made computerisation of air defence systems inescapable. With today's supersonic 
air craft, the warning time available between detection and attack can be as little as 
a few minutes - clearly too short for meaningful human response. A computer, on 
the other hand, can respond even within such short times. 
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3. AIR DEFENCE FUNCTIONS 
Let us now consider how a computer system implements the various functions & of air defence. The following is an enunciation of some of the common characteristics 
of commercially available air %fence systems: 
3.1 Tracking 
The first pre-requisite for engaging a target acquired by the radar is that it should 
be possible to track it. A computerised air defence system acquires target data primarily 
from 3-D radars equipped, either with hardkrare or software video extractors. It accepts 
information regarding range, azimuth, height and IFF codes of the targets detected. 
Similar information is accepted also from gap filling radars and neighbouring air 
E- " ven possible to incorporate information from visual 11 this data is converted into a common wordinate system 
and correlated. By making a scan to scan comparison of the target position, plots 
pertaining to each individual target are linked and tracks are generated alongwith 
speed, bearing, height and other details. Uncorrelated plots (which may be the result 
of static or slow moving objects) are eliminated. Track information is extrapolated 
in case echoes are missed during individual scans. The information so analysed is 
presented in. a properly human engineered form, so that the operator is qble to 'take 
it in' at a glance. Selective masking ofinformation is also possible (for example of all 
friendly Elircdt of all, aircraft outside a particular height range) for easy readability. 
by neighbouring Defenee 
3.2 Identification 
Information regarding available flight plans and IFF codes is used to identify 
whether a given target is a friend or an unexpected intruder. Aircraft within flight 
corridors can be classified as friendly. 
%- 3.3 Threat Evaluation 
bsc 
areas that may be under attack by the intruder are identified and 
the threat arising to each of them quantified using target height, speed, etc. It is also 
possible to identify specific points of importance which au ld  fall within the range of 
the intruder and are therefore threatened. Warnings can be sent to all of them, 
automatically. 
3.4 Weapon Allocation and Control 
Various alternatives such as surface to air missiles, interceptor aircraft and 
anti-aircraft guns may be available for- deployment. Depending on available 
information regarding the hostile target, the disposition of defensive weaponary 
available aid their readiness status, trial interceptions are worked out and the times 
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required for interception in each case are arrived at. The system can implement one 
out of the several such possibilities, depending upon the choice of the controller. For 
this, it assembles the profile out of standard segments (such as climb, acceleration, 
zoom, turn, etc.). The aim is to position the intercepter as close as possible t 
expected interception point. Segment data is displayed step by step, just at the 
when specific instructions are required to be communicated to the pilot, Corrections 
are made on line to account for manoeuvring by the target as well as deviations in 
the interceptor implementing earlier instructions. (An essentially similar procedure 
can be adopted even with respect to missile interception, except that the reaction 
times in this case require to be much smaller). The fuel consumption of the aircraft 
is also computed step by step and kept traek of throughout; an interception can be 
aborted if recovery is to become impossible due to fuel limitat 
The profile computation can be orga 
to the target: head on, broad side o 
to ensure minimum probability of d 
3.5 Recovery 
After successful (or aborted) interception, the interceptor is recovered, using a 
similar procedure aimed at computing an efficient profile. The relevant parameters 
are: fuel availability, distance to  recovery bases and the cootdinates of the interceptor. 
If recovery to home base is not possible (say due to fuel limitations), recovery is made 
to any other base. 
4. SIMULATION 
All these are indeed significant ~g~abil i$es which make computerisation very 
attractive. There is a further benefit that computeKsation provides; the performance 
of the system can be demonstrated, tested and evaluated without any aircraft even 
having to be air borne. It is possible, using simulation techniques, to provide aircraft 
data to the air defence system in real time in exactly the same manner as a radar 
does. This can be done for any predetermined flight exercise, of arbitrarily high 
complexity. Further, this simulation can be done by a separate program on the same - 
system. Alternatively, the exercise can be preplanned and information regarding 
hostile and unknown tracks can be computed and dumped on to a storage device 
(disk or tape). When this is played back, the system would treat it exactly as if it were 
live data a i d  react to it appropriately. 
Additionally, it is possible to record earlier real, life episodes and play them back 
on the system to do a post mortem evaluation of performance or to train novice 
operators on difficult situations. It is even possible to provide consoles on the systems 
for the 'target', and the 'interceptor' They could then have an 'engagement, and 
sharpen their tespective skills in a war game, without ever leaving the ground! 
There can be facilities for input and updating of environmental information such 
as metereological data, base status, flight plans and so on without interrupting regular 
system operation. 
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Needless to say, it is important to ensure that the target is detected. An air 
defence system can hardly deal with a target that it does not know about. To ensure 
a high probability of detection it is customary, for obvious reasons, to mount the 
radar heads on locafions of high elevation. While this improves visibility, it also raises 
the problem of ground clutter. 
5. AIR BORNE DEFENCE SYSTEM 
Despite the increasing coverage provided by radars of today, warning times are 
becoming uncomfortably small, due to increasing aircraft speeds. The obvious answer 
to the need for greater coverage is to base the radar at even greater heights than the 
terrain would permit: i.e. on flying platforms. Radars located at such heights would 
beyond the borders, right into memy territory and detect 
%*3' 
of its origin, thereby greatly increasing the time available 
for meaningful reaction. Such radars have necessarily to look down and need very 
special and advanced visual pattern processing techniques to detect moving targets in 
high clutter. This is the manner in which air borne warning and control systems 
(AWACS) operate. It has been stated that one air borne system is nearly as effective 
as 20 ground-based systems. A single AWACS can look oyer an area greater than 
500 thousand square kilometers and can track ships, fixed installations such as off 
shore production platforms, features on the ground as well as aircraft. The technique 
adopted for clutter removal is to compare pictures seen in two successive scans and 
essentially eliminate all features that are' common between these scans. This should 
be a straightforward, even if tedious procedure. This would require a memory with 
adequate capacitg to sea enoua  p&.& [in$ividual points or 'cells' of a picture) to 
ensure a reasonable resolution (of the order of 10 meters or so). What makes it 
complicated is the fact that the two pictures would not correlate easily because of the 
movement of the observation platform and the curvature of the earth. The 
computational load is such that even the most powerful super computers can get over 
loaded. Special array processors have to be used, taking advantage of the fact that 
the computation is laigely repetitive. Much of the information is processed on board. 
Defensive steps can then be initiated to counter any agressive moves that are detected. 
Instructions relating to this are then conveyed to ground-based Defence Stations. 
Such air borne systems, with the enormous computational loads they demand, could 
not even have been dreampt about, let alone realised, without computers. 
Two precautions are most important under such circumstances: 
electronic-counter-couder-measures and encryption of communication. Here again, 
computers have a major role to play. 
6. THE INDIAN SCENE 
An air defence system comparable to commercially available state-of-the-art 
systems has been developed under funding from the Department of Electronics by a 
group-of organisations headed by the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. This 
effort was based on purely indigenous know how. All the hardware and software 
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weret designed and developed locally. After successful triils, the know how for this 
system was transferred to Electronics Corporatiw of India Limited. Commercial 
production and induction of these systems into active use would greatly enhance the 
Defence capabilities of this country, given the geopolitical realities it has to contend 
with. 
7. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
There are several advantages of computerisation in air defence. We have already 
mentioned those of consistency and quality. Quality can be further improved over a 
period of time as the user group acquires experience with the various strategies that 
have already been implemented. 
Subject to the target being detected by the sensor, one can, with a high degree 
of confidence, assume that it will be engaged and o m f u l l y  intercepted. 
The intricacies of the calculations involved in the various steps of air defence 
activity are clearly beyond the capability of an operator, particula y at times of stress. 1, A computer is a great help in this regard; what is more, there is a f rther quantitative 
advantage. It is possible to deal with several hundreds of targets at a time and also 
carry out large numbers of simultaneous interceptions. In fact, the capability of modem 
computerised air defence system is such that it becomes very difficult and almost 
impractical to test them by live exercises. Simulation has to be resorted to. 
Computerisation also permits integration of information provided by a variety of 
sensors. This makes it possible to interlink a number of radars and exchange 
information between them, realising an efficient command, control and communication 
network. 
It is commonly thought that computeriieh air defence systems have reached such 
a high degree of efficiency'that they are unlikely to be called upon for actual use in 
combat. Intruders perforce fly at tree top heights to avoid detection. Consequently, 
use of a computerised air defence does not eliminate the possibility of attack, it places 
the enemy in a position of great disadvantage by forcing him to fly at low altitudes, 
thereby increasing his risk as well as reducing fuel efficiency and range considerably. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Totconclude, computerisation of air defence systems has brought about W t a t i v e  
and quantitative improvements to the defence capabilities of c o d e s  using it. The 
main limitations of computerised air defence pertain not so much to those of the 
computer but to the other components: the sensors, the communication systems and 
the human links. There is scope for further automation by way of eliminating the 
fallible controller-to-pilot-to-aircraft link and establishing a direct link between the 
control computer and the control system of the interceptor aircraft. This would permit 
faster response by reducing the loop delays and also minimise errors of communication 
and interpretation. However, this also raises the problem that this reduces the scope 
for human overseeing of the decision-making and execution process. 
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One would notice that most of the functions that the computer is called upon to 
rform are straightforward and mundane. The machine is hardly if ever called upon 
se 'intelligence' Advanced techniques such as Artificial Intelligence aod expert 
ms are yet to make significant inroads into the air defence scene. This is not very 
surprising; computerisation in such a vital area has to take a conservative approach. 
The main risk of computerisation is that, in a very broad sense, it 'stereotypes' 
responses to given situations. This makes it easy for the enemy to anticipate such 
responses and therefore adopt approaches, which maximise the probability of his 
success. This process of one-up-manship can exist even in anon computerised situation; 
however, it becomes much more bf a guessing game there because of the 
unpredictibility of human reactions. 
risation is that changes to existing str 
become slower to evolve and implement. Faced withan u~iorthodox situation, a 
cor,troller makes suitable on the spot responses with matching initiative and 
innovativeness. Atleasf, he would be quick to learn from such experiences and 
incorporate in his own strategy the necessary changes to surmount such problems. 
The human operator in a compuarised system has to operate at a more superficial 
level. He cannot initiate changes to the system on his own. Implementing chayes of 
strategy into computer software, should this turn out to be necessary, would require 
extensive effort in making the modifications, testing them fully and, most importantly, 
certifying that the new version of software is bug free. This can certainly not be done 
war is in progress. 
and all-pervasive question of reliability of 
software. Despite spectacular advances in software engineering and computer science, 
these have not progressed to a stage where sophisticated software systems can easily 
be certified to be totally reliable. Unpredictable performance in unanticipated 
situations cannot be completely ruled out. 
Despite these, the advantages of cemputerisation and the progress of weapons 
technology are such that Defence systems have to depend increasingly on 
. computerisation in the decades to come. 
